Germany's Bundestag has approved the government's cybersecurity strengthening bill (Drucksache 21/6585), granting the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Police powers to intervene in foreign IT systems to avert danger — the practice critics call "hackback" or active cyber defence.

Under the draft, the Federal Police get authority in a new § 41a BPolG and the BKA in §§ 68a–68f BKAG, plus a new task in § 3a BKAG. Both may prohibit the operation of an IT system and redirect, record, restrict or block data traffic. They may also read out, delete or alter "danger-relevant" data in the system from which the threat emanates — malicious programs, control and log files, attack traces, and data that is itself the object of the attack — without the knowledge of those affected. Third parties may be unavoidably affected; changes must be undone when the measure ends, but only where technically possible.

The trigger is a threat from an attack on IT security, defined by reference to criminal offences including §§ 202a, 202b, 202c, 202d, 263a, 303a and 303b StGB. Because § 202c criminalises preparation, the mere threat of a preparatory act suffices.

The contested point is judicial control. The explanatory memorandum states explicitly that neither qualified protected interests nor a judicial reservation is required, except for intrusions into private IT systems. A court order is required for intrusions into private systems without consent that enable data collection, when there is urgent danger to specified legal interests; in exigent circumstances the agency head can order the measure, valid only if a court confirms it within three days. With consent, the judicial reservation falls away, and the memorandum considers consent from the owner of a compromised system generally likely.

Notification applies only to the deepest intervention — reading out, deleting or altering — and only to the owner of the system affected. The agency may impose a non-disclosure order while disclosure would impede threat prevention or prosecution; after twelve months that needs court approval.

Critics, including the Chaos Computer Club, say judicial oversight is largely missing and the powers can be triggered by unduly trivial occasions. At a Bundestag committee hearing on October 5, the necessity of stronger cyber defence was undisputed, but experts including Kipker criticised insufficient judicial control, while BKA president Münch praised the bundling of threat prevention and prosecution in one hand. The Bundesrat wants a court order for all measures under § 68d BKAG; the government rejects that.

The verification problem is sharper than usual: whoever deletes and alters also alters evidence. The draft requires technical safeguards only "where possible", and the log need not record what was read, deleted or changed. Germany's Federal Constitutional Court has noted that a purely reading access does not exist once a system is infiltrated with monitoring software — a risk that also applies where deletion and alteration are expressly permitted. When a defence measure turns into evidence in a criminal file, defence lawyers say the legal basis, the bridge to prosecution and the integrity of the data all have to be reconstructed — and the draft contains no dedicated rule for that transition.