A researcher locked in a public feud with Microsoft has published a new Windows zero-day that lets ordinary local users seize full System rights — and, unusually, switch off antivirus defenses while doing it.
On Tuesday, the researcher Abdelhamid Naceri, who goes by Nightmare Eclipse, disclosed 'SignDrop', a privilege-escalation flaw in the Common Log File System (CLFS), Microsoft's general-purpose logging service used by clients running in user or kernel mode. According to Ars Technica, an attacker with ordinary user rights can make a privileged process such as Windows Defender open a crafted CLFS container, abusing that privileged file creation to elevate to System.
The exploit chains three ordinary Windows components: CLFS, Windows Defender and Windows file permissions. It calls ServerMpUpdateEngineSignature — a legitimate Defender function for processing antivirus signature updates — to make the antivirus engine open a log file created by a standard user. By manipulating Windows Object Manager symbolic links, the attacker gets Defender to open the CLFS container in the antimalware engine's security context. If an associated authentication file is missing, CLFS creates it using Defender's System privileges — and assigns the new file the access-control list of the original, handing the attacker a System-created file they can leverage.
What makes SignDrop notable is its target: because the arbitrary file creation happens inside the attacker's own trusted antimalware process, it can be used to bypass tamper protection and turn off any antivirus or EDR product, not just Defender. 'From the perspective of their kernel drivers, the file creation request is coming from their own legit process, so it passes,' Naceri wrote.
He said the exploit works against Windows 11 26H2, Windows 11 26H2 Experimental and Windows Server 2025 Experimental. Researcher Will Dormann told Ars he reproduced it as described, but found the requirements strict: it appears to need Windows 26H2 that has existed for more than 90 days, and the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication\Mode must be 0 or 1. Of Dormann's many machines, only one qualified.
System owners can gauge their exposure by checking the CLFS authentication mode: learning or enforcement mode indicates vulnerability, and the proof-of-concept should spawn a SYSTEM shell. SignDrop joins a run of CLFS-related disclosures from the same researcher — and, ironically, stems from a security mitigation Microsoft added in October 2025 to block earlier CLFS exploits. 'Everything is done properly by Microsoft here but the logic allows abuse,' Naceri wrote. Microsoft did not respond to Ars's request for comment.




