The US government published a new National Policy for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening on 5 November. It replaces the policy issued under the Biden administration and widens the net: not only synthetic DNA and RNA but also the equipment used to make them.
In practice, companies selling nucleic acid sequences and synthesis equipment must know their customers and screen orders to prevent malicious use. Recipients of federal funding will be required to buy synthetic nucleic acids from providers certified under the new policy — a lever that works through procurement rather than prohibition.
Responsibility is split. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will set government-wide procurement and physical-security standards for synthetic biology and certify that screening tools meet them, while HHS and USDA certify the providers themselves.
The backdrop is a falling barrier to entry. AI models and cheap synthesis make it easier to design a sequence and order it; biosecurity specialists have argued for years that order screening is the most tractable chokepoint a democracy actually controls. Science reports tempered praise from the field — support for the direction, scepticism about implementation.
The open questions are the usual ones for this kind of policy. How fast can NIST certify without becoming the bottleneck? What happens to researchers whose supplier does not clear certification? And how much of what is ordered outside the United States does the rule never see?



