ESET Research has documented a previously unknown, highly modular .NET malware suite that it attributes with high confidence to Turla — the Russia-aligned espionage group widely assessed to be part of the FSB, active since at least 2004.

The toolset is named Cereal, after its heavy reliance on serialization, and ESET found it on the Exchange servers of two government organizations: one in Kazakhstan, spotted on 28 November 2025, and one in Romania, compromised on 23 December 2025. In the Romanian case, one component was configured to single out messages sent to, or received from, NATO and EU institutional addresses — a focus ESET says fits long-standing Russian intelligence priorities and regional tensions over Russian drones and the Black Sea.

What sets Cereal apart is what ESET did not find: external command-and-control infrastructure. The main backdoor, CerealNeuron, initiates no outbound connections. Instead it runs on the compromised Exchange server and passively listens for incoming web requests on paths that mimic ordinary Exchange traffic — /owa/, Autodiscover, ActiveSync. Encrypted requests that pass several integrity checks are decrypted, treated as commands and executed; anything that looks wrong is redirected to a legitimate-looking Exchange error page. The victim's own internet-facing mail server becomes the operators' control point, and ESET says it could not identify the operators' ingress IP addresses.

The email collection module, CerealBox, is the most novel piece. Rather than registering a transport agent — which leaves traces in Exchange's configuration — it is injected into EdgeTransport.exe, the process that handles mail flow, and hooks the existing transport agents in memory, running its logic before handing control back to the original code. It selects messages with .doc, .docx or .pdf attachments that match hardcoded sender, recipient, subject and attachment lists, then compresses and encrypts them for later exfiltration with ordinary commands.

Commands themselves arrive as separate, small compiled .NET programs, each with the same wrapper and a different task — query Active Directory, run WMI queries, extract LSA secrets, list volume snapshots, read or delete staged mail. The volume of near-identical binaries suggests an internal framework that automates compilation and delivery. Cereal also leans hard on rarely used .NET behaviour: native code that runs before the .NET runtime via Vtable Fixups, malicious DLLs impersonating Windows components such as wbemcomn.dll, and abuse of the .NET native image cache to slip a tampered library named Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll past the runtime's checks.

The takeaway for defenders: on these networks, Exchange is not just a mail server — it is the collection point, the execution hub and the command post.