Nvidia's chief security officer left the company in August, and the details of that departure have taken on new weight as the investigation around former CEO Jensen Huang sprawls from a boardroom scandal into a national-security question.

David Reber spent four years as Nvidia's CSO and seven years at the company in total. He announced his exit on LinkedIn with a medical explanation: a diagnosis of young-onset Parkinson's disease more than two years earlier. "This wasn't a pivot I had planned," he wrote. "But I know what needs to come first: family and health." He has not answered questions about what his team knew.

His successor, Saša Zdjelar, spent 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston before a year at Salesforce and several years at the cybersecurity firm ReversingLabs. He has not publicly discussed the transition either. Nothing published connects the personnel changes to the Megaspeed case, and Nvidia has not answered questions about how its security organisation handled the matter.

The gap matters because of what the case allegedly involves. Huang resigned after admitting an affair with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data-centre company that US investigators suspect of routing Nvidia chips to China. The New York Times reported that Nvidia's top lawyer had been engaged with the government's Megaspeed inquiry more than a year earlier; the Times also cited five employees who said Huang was involved with a vice-president who reported directly to him, while Reuters later described a second relationship. Megaspeed denies wrongdoing.

A relationship with a person at a company under federal investigation is a different category of risk from an ordinary workplace affair, and insider-threat specialists argue that corporate security is structurally poor at seeing it. Nicholas Eftimiades, a retired senior intelligence officer who wrote "Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics" and says he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals, describes collection that leaves almost no technical trace: services harvest policy insight — who is blocking export controls, who can be leaned on — out of ordinary conversation, and the relationships they cultivate now last years rather than weeks. An executive complaining that he is "fighting a board who doesn't want to do this" has just told an asset where the obstacle sits.

Security teams, Eftimiades says, are cost centres with no revenue, and warnings are too often met with "not a nickel more than compliance". He notes the other side gets technology too: an IMSI catcher that impersonates a mobile tower can cost about $1,000 for a basic, suitcase-sized unit, with government-grade versions far pricier.

Some of the picture was visible inside Nvidia. Legal was tracking the Megaspeed scrutiny more than a year ago, and colleagues appear to have known about the relationships, which the code of conduct does not expressly prohibit. What remains unknown is whether any of that reached the security function — a question the board's independent investigation and the federal inquiries are likely to answer.

Eftimiades hopes the episode becomes a wake-up call for US industry, which he calls largely "clueless" about such tactics. "Whatever we think we're doing isn't working," he said.