Contact Form 7 is the plugin most WordPress sites install without thinking about it: a form builder with more than 10 million active installations. On 8 November it acquired a vulnerability scored 9.8 out of 10.
CVE-2026-114432 affects versions 6.2 through 6.2.3 and is fixed in 6.2.4. The flaw is in how the plugin stores files uploaded through a form's file field: it checks neither the type nor the extension, and a separate bug in the temporary-file cleanup leaves the upload on disk instead of deleting it. No account is required.
Whether that becomes remote code execution depends on the server. The CVE record names a stock Debian or Ubuntu Apache setup — directory listing on, the .phar extension mapped to the PHP handler — as the path to running the file. On other configurations, including nginx and Apache with .htaccess overrides enabled, the impact is limited to an arbitrary file written into the uploads directory. That file can still be served as active content, such as HTML or SVG, from the site's own origin.
The 9.8 comes from CISA's Vulnrichment programme, not from the CNA: WPScan, which publishes the record, assigns no CVSS score of its own. WPScan credits researcher Shinya Murakami. Its vulnerability database entry appeared on 5 November; the CVE record and NVD entry followed on 8 November.
Timing is the operative fact. The flaw is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, and Vulnrichment lists exploitation as "none" as of 8 November. WPScan says it will publish proof-of-concept detail on 19 November, after giving site owners time to update. That is a ten-day window in which the bug is public, the fix is available and the exploit is not. It will not stay that way.
What to do: update to 6.2.4 or later; check the plugin's upload directory for unexpected files, especially .phar; turn off directory listing and remove handler mappings for upload-reachable folders; and treat every form endpoint as public-facing, because the flaw needs no login.
A caveat worth stating plainly: 10 million installs is not 10 million vulnerable sites. Most hosts run configurations where the upload lands as a file rather than a shell, and many sites do not expose a file field at all. The correct response is still the same, because updating costs minutes and being wrong costs a webshell.




