When the Rhysida gang dumped data stolen from Berlin's Senate administration, it did not publish a tidy archive. According to Sascha Herzog, technical managing director and penetration tester at the Munich security firm NSIDE ATTACK LOGIC, his team measured 5.25 terabytes, about 1.43 million files and roughly 150,480 folders — close to, but not identical with, Rhysida's own claim of 5.79 TB and 1.44 million files. In an interview with iX (heise), he describes the unglamorous work of turning that mass into something clients can act on.
Downloading alone was an ordeal. The leak drew heavy demand, and pulling it through Tor ran as slow as 15 kbit/s; Rhysida changed the file structure three times, forcing the team to rewrite its download logic. Working with parallel Docker containers that fetch and reassemble file chunks, the job took about two and a half weeks. The data now sits on large NVMe SSDs; because the files came from Windows systems, the analysis runs on Windows with PowerShell search scripts.
Clients supply email domains, project names or terms to look for; the team turns those into rule sets and sorts hits by priority — an email matching several of the terms ranks as higher risk. Structured leaks are searched with Elasticsearch clusters, but Berlin's is largely unstructured. Scanned PDFs are OCR'd selectively, and the many 7-Zip archives inside the dump have not been evaluated yet — so Herzog expects more to surface over time. A single search run takes roughly 12 to 15 hours, and the firm cannot currently run several large customer searches in parallel.
Open-weight models are used locally for pre-screening, though only partly helpfully: one document was flagged as security-relevant merely because it contained the word geheim (secret). Herzog puts the leak's authenticity at about 99%, and estimates that 70 to 80% of Rhysida's own claims are accurate — the attackers likely ran an AI over the documents rather than reading them. He also takes a dissenting view on Berlin's refusal to pay the 30-bitcoin (about 2 million euro) ransom, whose deadline expired on 4 September: publishing the dump exposes many uninvolved people, companies and critical-infrastructure operators to phishing and worse, he argues — a cost the no-pay policy does not capture.




